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STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN S. MACKENZIE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
13636 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The statement as to the "Nature of the Case" and 
the Disposition in Lower Court" are as stated in Appel-
lant's Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks that the judgment granted in the 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts as indicated in Appellant's 
Brief are essentially correct with the following exceptions 
and additions. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellant's Brief indicated on page 2 that Thomas 
W. Mackenzie had "moved" from Ogden to New York 
City. The deposition of William Reilly (Dep. 11) indi-
cates that Mr. Mackenzie had not "moved from Ogden 
to New York City" hut was just on a seven-week train-
ing program. That Brief further states on page 2 that 
the insured "leaped" through a fifth floor hotel window 
in New York City. The deposition of the principal wit-
ness, Mr. William Reilly, (Dep. 16) indicated that Mr. 
Reilly was not in the room when the sound of breaking 
glass was heard. As indicated in this deposition, (Dep. 
14) Mr. Reilly and Mr. Mackenzie were scuffling; and 
Mr. Reilly said, "He was banging my head and banging 
my head, and by this time his body was on me." All evi-
dence indicates, and there is no dispute, that the window 
and blinds were shut and the drapes closed when Mr. 
Mackenzie's body ejected from the room. To say that 
Mr. Mackenzie "leaped" from the room implied that there 
was a voluntary act on his part. The facts do not neces-
sarily arrive at this conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION HOLD-
ING THAT THE DEATH WAS ACCIDEN-
TAL COULD BE SUSTAINED FROM THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING H I S 
DEATH. 
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POINT II. 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE INDICATES THAT THERE WAS 
NO INTENT ON MR. MACKENZIE'S PART 
OR EVEN "AN AWARENESS" THAT HIS 
ACTS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN ANY 
S E L F - I N F L I C T E D INJURY OR HIS 
DEATH. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE CASE LAW AND THE COURT 
DECISIONS HAVE UPHELD RECOVERY 
WHERE THE POLICY EXCLUDED PAY-
MENT BECAUSE OF A "MENTAL INFIRM-
ITY" WITH SIMILAR FACTS. 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION HOLD-
ING THAT THE DEATH WAS ACCIDEN-
TAL COULD BE SUSTAINED FROM THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING H I S 
DEATH. 
That the death of Mr. Mackenzie could be construed 
as accidental for the following reasons: 
1. That as Mr. Mackenzie was scuffling with his 
roommate, and as an aftermath of this fracas, his body 
could have been propelled through the window without 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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any action by the deceased, which would have caused his 
ejection from the room, and in that sense the death would 
be considered accidental. It is clearly evident that Mr, 
Mackenzie had sustained a "mental breakdown", and in 
all probability, he was entirely unconscious of any acts 
that occurred within an hour or so prior to his death. The 
general rule is as stated in 44 Am. Jur. 2nd, 1266, that 
suicide, while insane, is an accident. In discussing this 
subject the writer begins with the following paragraph: 
"The authorities are in accord that death of an 
insured by suicied or self-destruction while in 
sane, and without an intent to take his own life, 
is a death by accident or by accidental means 
within the meaning of an accident policy, since 
such death is unexpected and unintended. How-
ever, the conclusion has been reached that the 
insanity must be such as to render the insured 
unconscious of the nature of the act or its physi-
cal result, in order to be considered accidental." 
The American Jurisprudence article further refers 
to the case of Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, cited in 120 
U. S. 527 as follows: 
"In an accident insurance policy, as in the case 
of a life insurance policy, an exception of suicide 
does not generally comprehend suicide while 
insane, and even under a policy excepting suicide 
while sane or insane, a pistol-shot wound caus-
ing tetanus, with great bodily pain and delirium 
or fever, may be found to be the proximate 
cause of death where the insured later cuts his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
throat in period of delirium or state of frenzy 
which is uncontrollable." 
The A. L. R. Annotation, as cited in 16 A. L. R. 1402, 
entitled "Death from 'suicide' as an accident, or due to 
accidental means, within policy of accident insurance" 
directly discusses the issues involved. The case which 
precedes this annotation is Weber v. Interstate Business 
Men's Acci. Asso., cited on page 1390 of that annotation. 
This case involves the exact issues of the case at bar. 
In the Weber case it was admitted that the insured was 
insane; and, apparently, laid down on a railroad track 
in front of a train. The court there held that the jury 
verdict in favor of the beneficiary was sustained by the 
evidence, and that under similar circumstances the in-
surer was obligated to pay under the provisions of the 
accident policy. On page 1403 of this annotation the fol-
lowing general rules are given: 
"In a strict sense, suicide implies a conscious, 
intentional, voluntary destruction of one's own 
life. In a broader sense, however, the term in-
cludes the taking of one's life while insane, by 
acts which, in case of a sane person, would be 
regarded as suicide, and for the purposes of this 
annotation the latter meaning is included. 
The authorities are in accord that death of 
an insured by 'suicide' while insane, and with-
out any intent to take his own life, is a death 
by accident, or by accidental means, within the 
meaning of an accident policy — such death 
being unexpected and unintended. 
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United States. — Accident Ins. Co. v. Cran-
dal, (1887), 120 U. S. 527, 30 L. Ed. 740, 7 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 685. 
Illinois. — Grand Lodge, I. 0. M. A. v. 
Wieting, (1897), 168 111. 408, 61 Am. St. Rep. 
123, 48 N. E. 59. 
Iowa. — Tuttle v. Iowa State Traveling 
Men's Asso., (1905), 132 Iowa 652, 7 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 223,104 N. W. 1131. 
Michigan. — Blackstone v. Standard Life 
6 Acci. Co., (1889), 74 Mich. 592, 3 L. R. A. 
486, 42 N. W. 156. 
Minnesota. — Olsson v. Midland Ins. Co., 
(1917), 138 Minn. 424, 165 N. W. 474. 
Missouri. — Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty 
Co., (1918), 274 Mo. 83, 201 S. W. 1128; Scales 
v. National Life & Acci. Co., (1919), Mo. 
, 212 S. W. 8; Newell v. Fidelity & C. Co., 
(1919), Mo , 212 S. W. 991; Brunswick 
v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co., (1919), 278 Mo. 154, 
7 A. L. R. 1213, 213 S. W. 45; Wacker v National 
Life & Acci. Ins. Co., (1919), 201 Mo. App. 586, 
213 S. W. 869; Andrus v. Business Men's Acci. 
Asso., (1920), 283 Mo. 442, 13 A. L. R. 779, 223 
S. W. 70. 
North Dakota. — Weber v. Interstate Busi-
ness Men's C. C. I. Asso., (reparted herewith), 
ante, 1390. 
Wisconsin. — Cady v. Fidelity & C. Co., 
(1907), 134 Wis. 322, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260, 
113 N. W. 967. 
The court in Andrus v. Business Men's Acci. 
Asso., (1920), 283 Mo. 442, 13 A. L. R. 779, 223 
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S. W. 70, said: 'Where a result is produced by 
a means unexpected, unintended, and unantici-
pated, it is accidental; but if the act and the re-
sult produced are exactly what was in accordance 
with the intention of the actor, it was not acci-
dental. In this case the plaintiff can recover only 
if death was produced by accidental means. If 
the insured was sane, fully conscious of the effect 
of his act, and consciously intended to inflict 
death upon himself, then death which he in-
flicted in pursuance of that intention was not 
accidental.' 
And it will be observed that in the reported 
case (Weber v. Interstate Business Men's Acci. 
Asso., ante, 1390) it was held that, where an in-
sured commits suicide while so insane as not to 
comprehend the nature of the act, nor the phy-
sical result which will flow from it, his death 
is caused by accidental means within the mean-
ing of an accident policy. 
And in Grand Lodge, I. O. M. A. v. Wieting, 
(1897), 168 IU. 408, 61 Am. St. Rep. 123, 48 
N. E. 59, the court stated that there is a sub-
stantial concurrence of judicial decisions in the 
United States that, if at the time of the suicidal 
act the insured was so affected with insanity as 
to be unconscious of the act, or of the physical 
effect thereof, or was driven to its commission 
by an insane impulse which he had not the 
power to resist, the act of self-destruction is re-
garded as though it were the result of accident, 
or some irresistible external force. 
And in Blackstone v. Standard Life & Acci. 
Co., (1889), 74 Mich. 592, 3 L. R. A. 486, 42 N. 
W. 156, death caused by the cutting of his own 
throat by the insured while insane, without know-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
ing the result of his act, and not intending there-
by to kill himself, was held to constitute death 
by external, violent, and accidental means with-
in the meaning of the accident policy sued on. 
But in Streeter v. Western Union Mut. Life 
& Acci. So., (1887), 65 Mich. 199, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
882, 31 N. W. 779, it was held that the suicide 
of the insured could not be considered as a death 
by accident if the act was done for the purpose 
of self-destruction, and the insured was not un-
conscious at the time of inflicting the fatal 
wound, even though he was insane, and his in-
sanity was produced by a fall several weeks be-
fore the act was committed. 
And in Fidelity & C. C. v. Weise, (1899), 182 
111. 496, 55 N. E. 540, it was held that self-de-
struction is not classed as an accident, except it 
appears that the suicide was unconscious of the 
act or of the physical effect thereof, or was 
driven to the commission of the deed by an in-
sane impulse which he had not the power to re-
sist" 
In Travelers Insurance v. Melick, cited in 65 Fed. 
178, the court held that where the insured cut his throat 
in a period of delirium or state of frenzy, which was 
uncontrollable, this act was not an intentional self-
inflicted suicide; and recovery was allowed, even though 
the policy excepted suicide while sane or insane. In the 
Melick case the delirium was a result of tetanus infection 
caused by a pistol-shot wound. 
The A. L. R. Annotation, as cited in 9 A. L. R. 3d, 
1015, discusses cases construing the words "sane or in-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sane". In this annotation, on page 1025, the following 
is stated under the Section [b], "Comprehension re-
quired": 
"A number of courts have held that if the in-
sured was in such a mental state that he was not 
able to appreciate the physical nature and con-
sequences of the destructive act which resulted 
in his death, the death did not fall within the 
exclusionary clause of 'suicide, sane or insane.' 
oor its equivalents, even though the act which 
caused death, if committed by a sane person, 
would have been characterized as suicide": 
U. S. — Bigebw v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co., 93 
U. S. 284. 
Ga. — Christensen v. New England Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 31 S. E. 2d 214. 
///. — Dickerson v. Northwestern Mut. L. 
Ins. Co., 65 N. E. 694. 
Kan. — Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slo-
venian Catholic Union, 119 P. 2d 504. 
Ky. — Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Daviess, 
9 S. W. 812. 
Mich. — Streeter v. Western Union Mut. 
Life & Acci. Soc, 31 N. W. 779. 
Mo. — Adkins v. Columbia L. Ins. Co., 232 
5 W. 708. 
N. Y. — Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 
67 N. E. 83. 
Ohio — Pagenhardt v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., l 
6 Ohio Dec. 190. 
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Okla. — Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Plunk-
ett, 264 P. 827. 
Term. — Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 
5 Tenn. App. 436. 
Tex. — Parish v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 
49 S. W. 153. 
Wis. — Pierce v. Travelers9 L. Ins. Co., 113 
N. W. 967." 
POINT II. 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE INDICATES THAT THERE WAS 
NO INTENT ON MR. MACKENZIE'S PART 
OR EVEN "AN AWARENESS" THAT HIS 
ACTS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN ANY 
S E L F - I N F L I C T E D INJURY OR HIS 
DEATH. 
It is apparent from the holding of the lower court 
as follows: 
"The preponderance of the evidence is that self-
destruction was not the cause of diving or jump-
ing through the window, but confusion of escape 
concerning Lt. Calley or a misinterpretation as 
to what the window was, or as to what was on 
the other side of the window, or as to simply 
rushing against wall, causing general havoc." 
that the insured was not conscious of an act of self-de-
struction. If he knew what he was doing, and intended 
suicide, he would have opened the window and blinds 
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and not propelled himself through glass, etc. Of all of 
the cases which have been cited where the death was 
caused by jumping through a window, the insured had 
"opened the window" before the leap. There are, also, 
the other following circumstances that could have pre-
ceded his going through the window as follows: 
1. He could have been running in the room in his 
state of frenzy, and tripped or fallen over some object 
and fell through the window. 
2. That an an aftermath of the scuffling with his 
roommate, he could have accidentally struck the window 
and fallen through. 
3. In his oblivious condition and in attempting to 
escape from Mr. Reilly he could have thought that the 
window was a proper means of exit and escape to avoid 
further injury from the scuffle with his roommate who 
apprently was greater size than Mr. Mackenzie. 
The following cases all involve situations where the 
insured sustained death from some jumping incident 
either through a window or otherwise. In Cady v. Fidel-
ity, 113 N. W. 967, the insured, "in a state of alarm and 
was fleeing from some fancied danger", jumped down a 
staircase shaft; the court held as follows: 
"There is evidence tending to prove that when 
he [the insured] ran to the side of the shaft he 
was in a state of alarm and was fleeing from some 
fancied danger, and that a person in a delirious 
state is liable to do things dangerous to his own 
life or the lives of others under a misapprehen-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sion of what he is doing and its consequences. 
On the whole there is room for belief that when 
Mr. Cady went over the railing he did not ap-
preciate that he was going into the shaft; that he 
was not conscious of the nature of his act and 
did not have in mind any idea of self-destruction, 
which, as we have seen, is essential to suicide 
even of an insane person, one so bereft of reason 
as tto be incapable 'of understanding and ap-
preciating the moral nature and quality of his 
purpose.'" 
The case of Christensen v. New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Compay, cited in 31 S. E. 2, 214, was a case 
where the insured died as a result of falling or jumping 
from a hotel window while in a state of fright or delirium. 
The Georgia Court there held that: 
"In an action on a policy, where insured, who 
died as the result of falling or jumping from a 
hotel window while in state of fright or delirium, 
committed suicide within policy provision limit-
ing insurer's liability in such case to amount of 
premiums paid, was question for jury under 
evidence. — where the insured, within two years 
from the date of the issue of the policy, came to 
his death by jumping from the sixth story win-
dow of a hotel and landing on the roof of an-
other part of the hotel 43 and lA feet below, when 
the insured, by reason of an hallucination, 
jumped to escape from imaginary enemies, and 
did not realize that his act would as a natural 
consequence produce his death; held, that, under 
the foregoing clause, an intention, either sane 
or insane, on the part of the insured to take his 
own life would be necessary to constitute suicide 
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as defined thereby and so such intention not ap-
pearing, the company would be liable for the fact 
amount of the policy." 
It is, therefore, apparent that the insured, even if 
insane, must still have some awareness of his actions be-
fore the death will be considered self-inflicted on suicidal. 
Another "jumping case" is Ladwig v. National Guar-
dian Life Insurance, cited in 247 N. W. 2, 312. In this 
case the insured was apparently intoxicated when he 
jumped or stepped through the window. The court held 
as follows: 
"The condition here relieves the company from 
liability only where the self-destruction was in-
tentional, or committed by a party who was con-
scious of the nature of the act he was committing 
or about to commit, and conscious of its direct 
and immediate consequences, though the act 
may have been unaccompanied by any criminal 
or felonious intent or purpose. It does not apply 
or relieve the company where the death of the 
insured was accidental or may be properly said 
to have been caused by accident, though brought 
about, it may be, by his own hands or by some 
dangerous or destructive instrument held in 
them." 
The case of Keels v. Mutual Reserve, in the Circuit 
Court of South Carolina, 29 F. 198, was a case where the 
insured either intentionally shot himself with a pistol or 
fell from a fence causing the pistol to fire; the Court held 
as follows: 
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"A condition in the life insurance policy that it 
shall be void if the insured shall die by suicide, 
whether the act be voluntary or involuntary, does 
not apply where the death is a result of an acci-
dent, or an unintentional self-killing." 
POINT III. 
THAT THE CASE LAW AND THE COURT 
DECISIONS HAVE UPHELD RECOVERY 
WHERE THE POLICY EXCLUDED PAY-
MENT BECAUSE OF A "MENTAL INFIRM-
ITY" WITH SIMILAR FACTS. 
Regarding the policy exclusion for death caused in 
whole or in part by mental infirmity, several court deci-
sions have construed the language of this exception and 
allowed recovery from diverse causes of death. The Fed-
eral Court in Travelers Insurance Company v. Main, cited 
in 383 F. 2, 952, allowed recovery where the policy lan-
guage stated as follows: 
"Benefits are payable only if the death is not 
caused or contributed to by disease, or bodily or 
mental infirmity or medical treatment of such 
disease or infirmity, or by intentionally self-in-
flicted injury." 
Apparently, the insured, Robert C. Main, was suffer-
ing great mental tension from the responsibilities of his 
employment. He had approximately 100 employees under 
his supervision, and his duties were complex and techni-
cal. He had been taking barbiturates and tranquilizers 
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such as Equnil, Medomin, and Butibel pursuant to a 
doctor's prescription. The "mind drugs" were given to 
him to help control his tensions and anxieties from the 
"pressures" of his employment. The insured imbibed 
alcoholic beverages, and his death was caused by the 
depressing effect of alcohol and the barbiturates on the 
brain center, enhanced by the synergistic effect of each 
on the other. The court there sustained a verdict for the 
beneficiary, and held the death to be accidental and not 
contributed to by disease or "mental infirmity", as follows: 
"Tension, that is, intensity of feeling or effort, 
nervous anxiety, or nervous strain, could not be 
considered a 'disease or bodily or mental infirm-
ity,' within accidental death policy excluding 
coverage for death caused or contributed to by 
disease or bodily or mental infirmity." 
"Under Connecticut law, death of an insured as 
a result of the synergistic effect of taking bar-
biturate tablets and whiskey would be considered 
accidental within an accidental death benefit 
policy, even though insured intended to take the 
tablets and whiskey, where there was no show-
ing that insured intended to take sufficient al-
cohol and tablets to cause his death, and where 
there was nothing in evidence to overcome pre-
sumption that he did not intend to commit sui-
cide." 
Another case which involves a temporary mental 
disorder or disturbance of an acute nature is Grays \\ 
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, cited in 227 F. 
2, 445. The insured was shot and killed by a police offi-
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cer while suffering from a temporary mental disorder, 
and recovery was allowed. The court there held as fol-
lows: 
"If mental condition of insured, who was shot 
and killed by police officer while mentally de-
ranged, was a temporary disorder or disturbance 
rather than an infirmity or ailment of a more 
permanent nature, recovery of double indemnity 
could be had, under New York law, on life pol-
icy authorizing double recovery for accidental 
death except when death resulted directly or 
indirectly from illness or disease of any kind or 
from physical or mental infinnity." 
"Whether condition of insured, who was shot 
and killed by police officer while mentally de-
ranged, was a temporary disorder or a disease 
or infirmity, was a fact for jury to find in action 
on life policy permitting double recovery for 
accidental death except when death resulted di-
rectly or indirectly from illness or disease of any 
kind or from physical or mental infinnity." 
With the uncertainty as what actually transpired 
immediately prior to the fall of Mr. Mackenzie from the 
window and the case law construing identical policy lan-
guage, it would appear that there could be sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the lower court's holding. What actually 
caused Mr. Mackenzie to fall through the window will 
probably never be known, but the fact of the closed win-
dow, blinds, and drapes could indicate that the fall 
through them was never "intended"; and very well could 
have been "accidental". With the numerous cases cited 
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herein that requires some "mental awareness" of what 
is transpiring, the evidence could be sufficient to sustain 
the judgment granted in the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
We request that the judgment entered in favor of 
the plaintiff be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. MURRAY 
Attorney for Respondent 
341 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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